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Abstract
Divergent cumulative cultural evolution occurs when the cul-
tural evolutionary trajectory diverges from the biological evo-
lutionary trajectory. We consider the conditions under which
divergent cumulative cultural evolution can occur. We hy-
pothesize that two conditions are necessary. First that genetic
and cultural information are stored separately in the agent.
Second cultural information must be transferred horizontally
between agents of different generations. We implement a
model with these properties and show evidence of divergent
cultural evolution under both cooperative and competitive se-
lection pressures.
Introduction
Social learning is a form of learning that arises from social
situatedness (Lindblom and Ziemke, 2003) and is character-
ized by agents interacting with one another in order to learn.
Social learning can accelerate learning beyond that of indi-
vidual learning strategies (see Marriott and Chebib (2014);
Marriott et al. (2010)) and most notably is its ability to
support cumulative cultural evolution (Whiten et al., 2011;
Mesoudi et al., 2006; Henrich and McElreath, 2003; Boyd
and Richerson, 1996). Cumulative cultural evolution is an
adaptive process in which each generation can make im-
provements on the learned information inherited from their
parents’ generation (Dean et al., 2014; Kempe et al., 2014).
Genetic evolution and cultural evolution are parallel pro-
cesses that optimize information in a population. It is com-
mon to consider the interaction between these parallel pro-
cesses. Two effects have been well discussed with respect
to learning: the hiding effect is when learning shields genet-
ics from selection pressure, thus slowing the evolutionary
process, and the Baldwin effect is when learning stimulates
genetics, increasing particular selection pressures, and thus
speeding up evolutionary adaptation (Sznajder et al., 2012;
Paenke et al., 2006; Baldwin, 1896). These effects help de-
scribe the interaction between these parallel processes when
they cooperate to improve fitness.
Another way we can compare genetic and cultural evolu-
tion is according to the direction of the evolutionary trajec-
tory. It is possible for the cultural evolutionary trajectory to
diverge from the biological evolutionary trajectory. In par-
ticular, this means that the culture may evolve in directions
that are neutral or even detrimental to the biological impera-
tives of an agent or its genes. The biological imperatives of
genes are merely survival and reproduction (Dennett, 1995;
Dawkins, 1976). A divergent culture may be one that im-
pedes an agents’ abilities to survive and/or reproduce.
A simple non-human example of divergent evolutionary
trajectories is sexual selection. Females could select for
traits that correlate with fitness. In this case the culture and
the genetic evolution agree. However, females could select
for traits that do not correlate with fitness or correlate nega-
tively with fitness. In certain birds of paradise the power of
female selection has frustrated the fitness of males. Techni-
cally, this is not a case of cultural divergence since in sexual
selection divergence occurs between two genetic evolution-
ary trajectories (male and female) within a single species.
Some human cultures may frustrate the reproductive or
survival capabilities of some of their members (usually for
the apparent benefit of the culture). For instance, a Catholic
priest will abstain from reproducing according to the rule of
his culture. Also, a Samurai might kill himself out of shame
for failing to meet his cultural obligations. These cultural
practices impede the genetic imperative of the genes in these
individuals.
An extreme and rare case of cultural divergence would be
a case where every individual of the culture engages in detri-
mental cultural practices. This would include cases of mass
abstinence or mass suicide. Mass abstinence was a cultural
belief of the Shakers (in the 1770s-1780s). Some mass sui-
cides are caused for fear of capture by an enemy culture (as
in Masada, Israel in 74 CE or in Pilenai, Lithuania in 1336
CE). Others are caused by a cultural belief that the suicide
will grant reward in the afterlife (as with the Heaven’s Gate
mass suicide in 1997) or avoid punishment in this life (as in
Jonestown in 1978).
We believe divergent cultural evolution requires at least
two properties. First, genetic and cultural information must
be stored in separate information stores. This rules out mod-
els with horizontal transfer of genetic material. Second, hor-
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izontal transfer of cultural information occurs between indi-
viduals of the same generation or across generations. This
property rules out evolutionary development models where
phenotypic information is not transferred between individu-
als.
We believe these are necessary conditions and we believe
they are probably not sufficient conditions. It is difficult to
test this hypothesis since our implementation has many other
implicit conditions that may play an important role. Our
experiment is designed to test whether these conditions (plus
implicit others) can lead to divergent cultural evolution in
our population.
In Marriott and Chebib (2014) we demonstrated a sim-
ple instance of divergent genetic and cultural evolution in a
population with these properties. The experiment involved a
simple optimization problem, asexual agents, and no spatial
environment. Agents in that experiment showed accelerated
optimization and divergence of selection pressures for par-
ticular genes and memes.
We have reproduced this experiment in a virtual environ-
ment representing real space. Our agents engage in sexual
reproduction and are subject to natural selection. Our first
experiments in this environment involved simple agents with
no learning capabilities (Marriott and Chebib, 2015a,b). We
have augmented these agents with individual and social
learning mechanisms.
Divergent Cultural Evolution
In Marriott and Chebib (2014) we implemented a simple
proof of concept and demonstration of divergent cumula-
tive cultural evolution. Agents in our model engage in all
three modes of adaptation: phylogenetic, ontogenetic, and
sociogenetic. Phylogenetic adaptation is adaptation by ge-
netic evolution. Ontogenetic adaptation is lifetime adapta-
tion. Sociogenetic adaptation is the result of exchanging
learned material between agents.
The dual inheritance model (see Fig. 1) describes how
these three modes of adaptation interact to create the agent
(Marriott and Chebib, 2016b). Genetic information is in-
ert over the lifetime of the agent in our model. It is trans-
mitted vertically (from parent to child) during reproductive
events and is responsible for the creation of initial cultural
(memetic) information that is active during an agent’s life.
Memetic information is used during the lifetime of the agent
to select a behavior for a particular situation and this infor-
mation is also adaptive.
As agents are units of selection in our simulation natural
selection occurs on the lifetime behavior of an agent (i.e. its
phenotype). This behavior is determined by an interaction
of an agent’s genome, memome and environment. As a re-
sult both genetic and memetic information is important in
determining if an agent lives and reproduces. In our model
memetic selection also occurs. However, this selection is
carried out by agents when they select what information to
Figure 1: The dual inheritance model.
use, what information to share and whether or not to share
their information.
There are two important ways that divergence can oc-
cur between genetic and cultural evolution. It is common
that evolutionary trajectories in both the genetic and cultural
realm are aligned. This is common when they are both try-
ing to optimize a behavior. In these cases it is expected
that cultural optimization of the behavior will outpace ge-
netic optimization primarily due to the different the different
timescales of these adaptive mechanisms. The only diver-
gence here is in terms of the rate of optimization. We call
this divergence under cooperative selection pressures.
The second type of divergence occurs when genetic selec-
tion pressures and cultural selection pressures are contrary.
For instance, sexual reproduction is favored by genetic se-
lection but suppressed in many (human and non-human) cul-
tures. We call this divergence under competitive selection
pressures.
We believe that both types of divergence require the prop-
erties stated above. That is, genetic and cultural information
must be separate and cultural information must be transmit-
ted horizontally. We will test our implementation for both
types of divergence.
Model
We have improved on our proof of concept by placing our
agents in an environment in which they compete for re-
sources and are subjected to a form of natural selection (i.e.
Figure 2: A typical gene consisting of gathering, non-
gathering, and travel components.
compete for mates) instead of artificial selection (i.e. face a
fitness function).
Our agents live in a random geometric network of re-
source sites (Penrose, 2003). Random geometric networks
are an approximation of two dimensional physical space.
At each site agents can spend time gathering the resources
available at that site. Sites in our current model have one,
two or three resources available to an agent that gathers at
that site. Agents in our model have genetically or memeti-
cally encoded strategies for gathering at a site and the strat-
egy determines the energy cost to the agent. The energy cost
is always at least the number of resources available at that
site (one, two or three) and at most five.
Agents have a simple metabolism in which resources are
converted into energy. Energy is used to move around
the environment, gather resources, and perform actions like
breeding, learning and social learning. Additional small
daily energy penalties are administered for idle activity, old
age, and length of genome (only during reproduction). At
the end of each day an agent has a net gain or loss of energy
and this contributes to whether the agent lives or dies and
whether it has enough energy to reproduce.
Genome
As mentioned above, in the dual inheritance model an
agent’s genome is inert during its lifetime and therefore is
not adaptive nor directly active in behavior selection. The
primary purpose of its genome is to spread genetic informa-
tion in reproductive events. The secondary purpose of its
genome is to produce an agent’s memome upon its birth.
A genome of an agent represents a path of resources sites
in the random geometric network. At each site on this path
is also encoded possible behaviors for an agent at that site.
That is, a genome represents a single long path through the
network and the actions an agent might take at each site.
We call each site in this path a gene in the genome. A
typical gene consists of three parts. A gathering component
encodes a strategy for gathering resources at the respective
site. A non-gathering component encodes the energy spent
on non-gathering actions like breeding, learning and social-
izing. Energy in our model correlates with time (except in
reproduction). In general, more time (energy) spent breed-
ing, learning or socializing increases the likelihood of these
activities being successful (more on this below). Finally, a
gene has a travel component which encodes the energy cost
of traveling to the next site in the path.
Breeding in our model occurs by sexual reproduction so
breeding is a social activity. In our environment two agents
must be at the same site at the same time to breed. If both
agents are performing the breed action for overlapping pe-
riods of time then a successful sexual reproduction occurs.
We can see that more time spent breeding during the day
will increase an agent’s chances of reproducing. However,
spending time breeding comes at an energy cost to the agent
as well so it can’t afford to spend all of its time breeding.
During sexual reproduction an offspring’s genome is cre-
ated as a recombination of its parents’ genomes. Recom-
bination uses the longest common subsequence of the two
genomes. The offspring’s genome also has an opportunity
to mutate in this process (see Marriott and Chebib (2015b)
for more details of genetic mechanisms). Only in these cases
is a genome active during an agent’s lifetime.
At birth each agent’s genome creates a memome. A mem-
ome consists of a collection of memeplexes. Each memeplex
in our model represents a possible set of activities for a sin-
gle day. Memeplexes are subsequences of a genome. During
memome generation we start at each gene in a genome and
we copy gene by gene into a memeplex. This continues un-
til the total energy of a segment approaches the maximum
daily energy for an agent. If copying the next gene would
exceed the maximum energy the segment is complete and
the memeplex is stored. Memeplexes are stored in the mem-
ome along with other memeplexes starting with the same
initial site for behavior selection (see below).
Additionally, segments are copied in a backwards direc-
tion from every gene. This means every gene in a genome is
responsible for two memeplexes in its memome except the
endpoints that are responsible for only a single memeplex.
Notice that since every site in the environment is not neces-
sarily represented in a genome there may be sites that do not
have corresponding memeplexes.
Memome
Our agent’s cognitive model is inspired by the pandemonium
model (Jackson, 1987; Franklin, 1997; Marriott et al., 2010).
Each memeplex is a sub-path of a genome and thus is a path
in the random geometric network. A memeplex represents a
single day’s worth of activities. In the pandemonium model
a memeplex is referred to as a daemon. Daemons compete
for control of an agent and in our model memeplexes com-
pete for control of an agent.
Behavior selection is also quite similar to the MAP-
elites strategy for multi-objective evolutionary optimization
(Mouret and Clune, 2015). We have memeplexes organized
in the memome based on the starting site. An agent’s day be-
gins by selecting all memeplexes in its memome that begin
at the agent’s current site. Recall that these memeplexes rep-
resent a full day’s worth of activities. The memeplex from
this set that rewards the maximum (expected) resources for
the day while minimizing the energy expenditure is selected.
This is the primary force of cultural selection in our cur-
rent implementation. It means that memeplexes with max-
imum resource-to-energy ratio are selected as behaviors.
Since in our social learning mechanism agents that engage
in social learning share only the current day’s memeplex it
means this selection mechanism is also used to select which
memeplexes are shared during social learning.
An agent can engage in individual learning only if its se-
lected memeplex includes at least one meme that has a non-
zero learning component. This means that an agent must
spend time engaged in learning at at least one site during a
day. When this occurs an agent will clone its memeplex for
the day and apply a mutation. The new memeplex is added
to its memome. This allows an agent to possibly generate
a memeplex that is more efficient at the same activities or
generate an alternative sequence of activities.
We can see that having non-zero learning components in
memes would benefit the agent. However, spending time
learning during the day comes at an energy cost, as with
breeding. Further, as our current implementation only al-
lows a single learning event in a day it is not beneficial for
an agent to spend more than the minimum amount of time
learning.
An agent can engage in social learning once per day. The
process for social learning is very similar to the process for
sexual reproduction. Social learning can only occur if an
agent spends time engaged in a social learning action at least
one site during a day. However, for social learning to occur,
another agent must also be at the same site at the same time
engaged in social learning. If this occurs then the two agents
will swap mutated copies of the memeplexes they used for
that day. We treat this mechanism as roughly equivalent to
telling the other agent what they did for the day.
Again we see a benefit to having social learning in memes
as this will increase the chances of an exchange of meme-
plexes. However, as with learning and breeding, an agent
cannot afford to spend too much time performing social
learning during a day.
Both of these learning mechanisms allow for new meme-
plexes to be added to the memome which means an agent
can adapt its behavior. When it begins its day at the same
site again it may select one of the new memeplexes instead.
Experimental Setup
We conduct three similar experimental runs with agents
of different capabilities. The first control group we call
breeders, and while they still have memomes, their learn-
ing and social learning mechanisms have been turned off.
In these agents, learning and social learning components
of genes/memes are still present but inactive. The sec-
ond control group we call learners. They are similar to
breeders as they still lack social learning mechanisms, but
they have their individual learning mechanisms intact. Like
the breeders, they still have social learning components of
genes/memes but they are inactive. The third group is our
experimental group. We call them socializers and they have
all the functionality described above.
Each run is seeded with one hundred randomly generated
agents. All genes in the randomly generated genome have
learning and social learning components initialized to zero.
Since it would be impossible for agents to breed if this were
true of breeding components, we instead have a chance of
initializing breeding components to non-zero values. As a
result, agents must mutate learning and social learning in or-
der to take advantage of these mechanisms. We allow our
simulations to run for 5000 days. Under these settings every
initial population is viable although some of our socializer
simulations terminate early due to a catastrophic colony col-
lapse (see below).
We gather data on many aspects of our agents’ lives.
In particular we gather information on the proportion of a
genome or memeplex devoted to breeding, learning or so-
cial learning. Recall that genomes and memeplexes are both
paths of sites and they can vary in length from agent to
agent. We can measure the length of a genome or meme-
plex in two ways. We can count the number of genes/memes
(representing sites) or we can measure the energy cost of a
genome/memeplex as a whole. We record the proportion of
a genome/memeplex devoted to breeding as the total energy
devoted to breeding in a genome/memeplex over the total
energy cost of the genome/memeplex. We do the same for
learning and social learning.
We use a slightly different method to calculate the opti-
mization of a genome/memeplex. For each site there is a
gathering action. Recall the action will cost energy at least
the number of resources rewarded at a site (one, two or three)
and at most five. We can count all energy used above the
minimum as wasted energy. For each genome/memeplex we
compute the average wasted energy per gene/meme.
The control groups of breeders and learners should not
display divergent cumulative cultural evolution. Among the
control groups we expect differences in genome and meme-
plex measurements but we expect these differences to be
small. In the socializers we expect to see evidence of di-
vergent cumulative cultural evolution. We expect meme-
plexes will show evidence of greater optimization than the
genomes, at least after enough time for cumulative cultural
evolution to emerge. Recall this is a case of divergence un-
der cooperative selection pressures.
We also expect to see divergence under competitive selec-
tion pressures (i.e. when they pull in different directions).
We expect that genetic selection will select for breeding
while also having indirect selection for learning and social
learning. We expect that there will remain some selection
pressure for social learning and learning in the memeplexes,
but the pressure to optimize these actions out of a memeplex
will also be strong. Breeding is not to the advantage of the
Figure 3: Generation over time for breeders and socializ-
ers. Generation is defined as the maximum generation in the
population. A child’s generation is one greater than the max
of its parents’ generations.
memetic selection mechanism so we expect it to be selected
against by memetic selection.
Observations and Discussion
Our experiment was replicated 130 times on a variety of ran-
dom geometric networks. All data presented in this section
is averaged over these 130 runs.
We wish to begin with a discussion of an apparent slow-
down of genetic evolution caused by cultural evolution.
When we first investigated the breeding, learning and social
learning genes in the genomes of socializers we found that
gene concentrations for these components grow at the same
rate for our two control groups but at a slower rate for the
socializers. We thought this could be due to a hiding effect
occurring between cultural evolution and genetic evolution.
We saw a similar effect on genome length over time and
other data we gathered. However with further investiga-
tion we were able to determine the source of the slowdown.
In both control groups the generation of agents increased
at identical rates. The generations of socializers increased
at about half the rate (Figure 3). This is due to an emer-
gence of eusocial breeding culture in our agents (Marriott
and Chebib, 2016b).
We think this evidence suggests that cultural evolution can
slow genetic evolution over time, but possibly not over gen-
erations. That is, the shielding of genetic selection pressure
is not really there. Instead there is a selection pressure for
longer generations which has the result of slowing genetic
evolution over time.
To confirm this we plotted gene concentrations over gen-
erations instead of days (Figure 4). We can see that the so-
cializers actually have weak acceleration of evolution over
Figure 4: Concentration of breeding, learning, and socializ-
ing genes in the genomes of breeders (dotted) and socializers
(solid) over generations.
Figure 5: Average wasted energy per gene/meme in the
genomes and memomes of breeders and socializers.
time according to this plot. These differences are small. We
suspect that a greater significant difference might occur if
we allowed our simulation to run for more days.
Now we wish to consider evidence for divergence under
cooperative selection pressures. So we turn to a discussion
of the relative optimization of genomes and memeplexes.
Breeders and socializers showed a slight trend to less op-
timized genomes over time (Figure 5). This is not unex-
pected as much of the genome is not actually used during
the agent’s lifetime and thus is not subjected to selection at
all. Further the genomes of agents increase overtime so this
increases the size of the unused region. This has a result of
stagnation of optimization in the genome except for a very
small region. We can see in the control groups that this re-
Figure 6: Concentration of breeding, learning, and socializ-
ing memes in the memomes of breeders (dotted) and social-
izers (solid).
gion is indeed optimized. We see this in the measurement
of optimization of the daily memeplexes. The memeplexes
selected for activity are more optimized than the genome as
a whole. The memeplexes in the control runs undergo an
early stage of optimization before stagnating.
In the socializers there is also an early stage of optimiza-
tion before stagnation. However the stage of optimization
is considerably greater in socializers than non-socializers.
Stagnation in the control runs is in part due to a weak genetic
selection pressure for optimization. Selection pressure for
optimization in the memome is stronger and most evolved
memeplexes are highly optimized (nearing zero wasted en-
ergy). However the data shows an average of all agents in the
population. Only older agents have the evolved memeplexes
and the younger agents have memeplexes that are still just
close copies of regions of their genomes. When we average
over all agents we will never optimize to zero.
Now let’s consider divergence under competitive selec-
tion (see Fig 6). The strongest competitive pressure is rela-
tive to breeding actions. Treating memeplexes as a type of
parasitic organism we can see that they are only concerned
with their replication into new hosts. They are not concerned
with their host’s reproduction, even if this leads to fewer
available hosts in the long run. A common end for this type
of parasite is to die off after killing all available hosts.
We observe that soon after social learning emerges in the
population memeplexes diverge from the genome. Breeding
actions in a genome continue to be selected for, but breeding
actions in a memome are selected against and their concen-
tration decreases before stagnating. Notice again this stag-
nation is due in part to the averaging over the population.
Some agents still are young and have a higher concentration
of breeding actions than more evolved memeplexes.
We observe that in many socializers, breeding actions in
their memeplexes are reduced to zero. This is also clear by
noting that about 54% of breeders and learners have chil-
dren while only 36% of socializers do. Memeplexes co-opt
the agent for their reproductive ends instead of the genome’s
reproductive ends.
Interesting cases of collapsed colonies occur when these
memeplexes spread to all agents before they can breed. In
many runs of socializers we witness isolated colonies com-
pletely dying out. Out of 100 runs 21 ended when all agents
died out before the 5000 day limit is reached. This only oc-
curs in socializers.
In breeders and learners, colonies can face extinction due
to a shortage of resources caused by overpopulation. In these
situations agents can’t get enough resources to reproduce
and in some cases can’t get enough to survive. However this
situation cures itself as agents die out. As agents die, they
no longer collect resources. The resources can instead go to
the young and eventually young agents can reproduce. This
causes cycles in population density but never a collapse.
Consider learning and social learning actions. There is
strong early selection pressure in genomes and memomes
for these actions. However as social learning kicks in,
memetic selection against wasting time on these action takes
over. Remember it is beneficial to spend as little time as
possible on learning and so optimized memeplexes spend
energy learning at only a single site. Many optimized meme-
plexes do not spend energy on learning at all. This is a detri-
ment but if a memeplex is already highly optimized there is
little benefit to learning. Further if a memeplex still spends
time social learning an agent can still be adaptive.
It is also beneficial to not waste time on social learning.
As above when social learning begins optimization places a
negative selection pressure on social learning actions. How-
ever it is a memeplex’s responsibility to spread itself. A
memeplex that evolves to spend no time on social learning
will never be spread (but may still be useful to an agent).
Thus, we usually observe at least one site in a memeplex
with social learning time and often more. This means that
a memeplex usually has a particular site at which it spreads
itself to other agents. This builds cultures of agents around
meme spreading sites.
We notice for all breeding, learning and social learning
actions as well as for optimization, cumulative cultural evo-
lution causes a divergent effect from genetic evolution. In
our simulations, this period of time occurred early on (in
the first 500 days) and then social learning maintains an op-
timized culture through spreading evolved memeplexes to
new agents.
To track cumulative cultural evolution we also assigned
a generation to each memeplex. All original memeplexes
created at birth are assigned generation zero. Whenever it
is cloned in learning or social learning the clone is assigned
generation one higher than its parent.
Figure 7: Average and maximum generation of active
memeplexes over time with one standard deviation around
the mean.
We can detect cumulative cultural evolution by detecting
an increase in memeplex generation over time, especially
from generation to generation (Figure 7). We can indeed
confirm cumulative cultural evolution in our socializers by
this method. Of course breeders can only have a memeplex
generation of zero. Learners however can have a meme-
plex generation above zero if they learn better memeplexes.
However these memeplexes can never leave their initial host
and die with the host. Therefore, no cumulative culture can
accrue (Kempe et al., 2014). We do see that learning agents
can maintain a low non-zero memeplex generation but not
one that increases over time.
Interestingly, in the socializers we do notice two stages in
memeplex generation growth. The initial stage is more rapid
and the second stage grows slowly at a fixed rate over time.
We note that the period of rapid growth coincides with the
period in which the memeplexes are being optimized prior to
stagnation. The slower growth rate coincides with the stage
where agents pass around optimized memeplexes.
Conclusions
Our implementation incorporated two information stores,
one for genetic information and one for cultural information.
It also had mechanisms of horizontal transfer of cultural in-
formation between agents of multiple generations. Our im-
plementation is an example of our dual inheritance model of
cultural evolution (Marriott and Chebib, 2016a). Our imple-
mentation demonstrates divergent cumulative cultural evo-
lution under both conditions of cooperative and competitive
selection pressures.
We can see that populations of agents that participate in
the dual inheritance model can accelerate optimization rela-
tive to selection pressures that are cooperative between the
genetic and memetic world. This is due to the potential for
many cultural generations in a single biological generation.
Thus, optimization can occur much faster over real time in
cultural evolution than in biological evolution. Further, since
the selection pressure on both the genome and the memome
operate in the same direction there cannot be conflict be-
tween these pressures. The only divergence in this case is in
terms of speed to convergence.
We also see cases where the selection pressure on the
genome operates in an opposite direction for the memome.
Genes and memes care only for spreading themselves. For
genes, spreading occurs through reproductive events but for
memes spreading occurs through social learning events. So
it is not surprising that genes that increase the success of
reproductive events are selected for by biological evolution
and memes that increase the number and success of social
learning events are selected for by cultural selection.
The contrary is not necessarily true. Genes that increase
the number and success of social learning events may be
selected for by biological evolution if social learning also
helps improve survival or reproductive success. This is true
in our simulation. Memes that increase the number and suc-
cess of reproductive events have only a distant and indirect
impact on the number and success of social learning actions.
Since they also have a detrimental effect on the optimization
of the memeplex there is a considerably stronger selection
to avoid these actions.
Finally, we still see an interesting divergence in behav-
ior of young (inexperienced) agents and old (experienced)
agents. Young agents have had very little or no time to adapt
their initial set of memeplexes either through individual opti-
mization or through learning from others. Thus their behav-
ior is still largely determined by their genome, which may
also be the case in humans (Tomasello, 2016; Csibra and
Gergely, 2011). This means they are more likely to breed,
learn and social learn than old agents because all of these
actions occur in much higher concentrations in the genome
than in the memome.
The interesting impact of these trends is that young agents
are more likely to be parents (i.e. before they learn bet-
ter). They are more likely to learn from the environment
more than older experienced agents. Finally, they are also
more social. They are more likely to seek out social learn-
ing events than old agents. We find this conclusion inter-
esting for two reasons. First, we see an emergent organiza-
tion in our populations around age. Second this organization
mimics the same organizations in other models and natural
populations (Lehmann et al., 2013; Thornton and Malapert,
2009). Young humans are more likely to have children, more
likely to attempt to improve themselves through learning,
and more likely to seek out the knowledge of others than
their older counterparts (Demps et al., 2012; Hewlett et al.,
2011). Further older humans that engage in social learning
are more often teachers than learners and this is also born
out by our experiment.
Finally we believe that the observed divergent cumulative
cultural evolution is due to a critical component of the dual
inheritance model. Specifically we think it is critical to keep
genetic and cultural information separate from one another
even if they store the same kinds of information (as in our
implementation). Without separate information stores there
is no environment for divergence to occur. Secondly it is im-
portant that cultural information can be transmitted between
members of the same generation and between generations.
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